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ABSTRACT 
   
Modern day driving continues to burgeon with attention detractors found 
inside and outside drivers' vehicles (e.g. cell phones, other road users, etc.). This 
study explores a regularly disregarded attention detractor experienced by drivers: 
self-regulation. Results suggest self-regulation and WMC has the potential to 
affect attentional control, producing maladaptive changes in driving performance 
in maximum speed, acceleration, and time headway.  
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Chapter 1 
WORKING MEMORY CAPACITY, ATTENTION, & DRIVING 
Since the introduction of the automobile more than a century ago, the core 
interaction between driver and vehicle has stayed relatively the same.  But with 
the environment inside and outside personal vehicles becoming more complex, 
(Cnossen et al. 1997; Miura 1990; Summala, Nieminen, & Punto, 1996; Young et 
al. 2009) drivers’ ability to appropriately allocate attention has become 
challenged, resulting in inferior driving performances, injury, or even death.  
Most studies seeking to identify attention detracting effects while driving use 
secondary attention consuming tasks (e.g. cell phones, in-vehicle manipulations, 
etc.).  This study will seek to identify a more insidious attention depleting 
manipulation most drivers have dealt with on a daily commute: self-regulation 
before and while driving.  
The ability to control attention while driving is imperative (Johannsdottir 
& Herdsman 2010).  This ability to process and store information while under 
concurrent cognitive load is commonly referred to as working memory capacity 
(WMC; Baddeley & Hitch 1974).    Following the pioneering work of Baddeley 
and Hitch (1974), numerous results have suggested that WMC is a mental 
“workspace” through which storage and processing exact upon the same limited 
resource.  Once this resource is overloaded, either through interference from a 
concurrent task or a distractor, a decrease in processing (or increases in difficulty 
of processing) occurs, which usually results in a loss of information from short-
term memory (Anderson, Reder, & Lebiere, 1996; Case, Kurland, & Goldberg, 
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1982; Conway & Engle, 1994; Daneman & Carpenter, 1980; Just & Carpenter, 
1992).  However, a more current conception of WMC redefines the system not as 
simply a “resource,” but rather, as an “ability” to control attention (Cowan, 2005; 
Kane et al., 2001) or manage executive control functions (Miyake et al. 2000).  
Individual differences are widely accepted to be synonymous with this ability.  As 
such, those with higher WMC are thought to be better able to command attention 
despite the proactive interference of irrelevant information (Engle, Tuholski, 
Laughlin, & Conway, 1999; Friedman & Miyake, 2004).  As such, WMC is 
considered the locus of attentional control (e.g., Kane et al., 2004). 
Increasing demands on attention almost always decreases one’s ability to 
safely operate a vehicle.  For example, Recarte & Nunes (2003) found that 
subjects who drove an instrumented vehicle through real traffic conditions 
experienced impairments in their spatial gaze concentration and visual-detection 
when mental workload was increased.  Ocular behavior analysis revealed that this 
impairment was due to late detection and poor identification. Similarly, driving 
while attending to a secondary task that overwhelms mental capacity has been 
shown to cause changes in driving behavior such as improper yielding to right-of-
way traffic, dangerous interactions with other road users, and increases in speed 
(Antilla & Luoma 2005).   
Neurophysiological measures of spatial attention have illustrated that this 
ability to resist attentional capture from distracting information varies depending 
on individual differences in WMC (Fukada & Vogel, 2009). Individuals with high 
WMC were much more capable of resisting attentional capture compared to low 
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WMC individuals.  Correspondingly, individuals with low WMC involuntarily 
reallocated spatial attention away from the salient task when distractors were 
presented.  These results suggest that individual differences in attentional control 
affect vigilant focus on the primary driving task.   
This evidence illustrates the powerful association between attentional 
control and driving.  However, if driving is considered solely with this calculated 
perspective, behavioral allocation would be directly dependent on the relevance 
and appropriateness of the driving goal.  Assuming that each driver’s goal is to 
arrive at their destination timely and safe, under normal cognitive demands 
individuals should only demonstrate driving behaviors conducive to safe and 
efficient travel.  Unfortunately, this is simply not the case, and dangerous, 
irrational behaviors frequently occur despite commutes requiring relatively low 
levels of cognitive effort.  What then is influencing drivers to behave in 
irrationally (and ultimately unsafe) inattentive ways despite these cognitively 
manageable conditions? 
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Chapter 2 
SELF-REGULATION & DRIVING 
Research in self-regulation and rational choice suggests that the ability to 
control one’s self (i.e., behave rationally) stems from the same ability to exact 
cognitive action, and this effort to self-regulate can persist over time, affecting 
subsequent measures of attentional control (Baumeister et al., 1998; Ward & 
Mann 2000; Schmeichel, Vohs, & Baumeister 2003).  This maladaptive effect of 
self-regulation on subsequent attention demanding tasks is commonly referred to 
as ego depletion; that self-regulative ability is drawn from a limited resource, and 
when exhausted, mental activity requiring further self-regulation is impaired 
(Baumeister et al. 1998). Recently, the notion of self-regulation capabilities has 
been refined beyond the notion of just action through a limited resource, and 
instead now includes the ability to direct self-regulation resources (Baumeister & 
Vohs, 2007; Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). 
Self-regulation’s influence on attention control has been demonstrated 
across numerous studies.  Schmeichel, Vohs, & Baumeister (2003) were able to 
show evidence that WMC and self-regulation are in fact dependent upon the same 
cognitive resource.  In their experiments, subjects who initially self-regulated by 
actively ignoring words on the bottom of a video exhibited reduced ability to 
divide attention during a subsequent test of WMC on the Operation Span task 
(OSpan; Turner & Engle, 1989).  Further examination found that this effect also 
worked in reverse, with tests of divided attention negatively affecting subsequent 
suppression of emotion.  Similarly, individual differences in self-regulative ability 
5 
show “high” ability self-regulators as better able to focus on goal-directed 
behaviors bringing about desirable long-term results (Baumeister, 2005; Fishbach 
& Labroo, 2007).  Conversely, “low” ability self-regulators are more likely to 
succumb to impulse and immediately gratifying desires (Metcalfe & Mischel, 
1999).    
This sharing of attentional resources is further supported by physiological 
measures of subjects after self-regulation, whom showed a significant depletion in 
blood glucose levels compared to control subjects (Gailliot et al. 2007).  
Numerous studies highlight the role of glucose in proper cognitive function as a 
vital source of energy (e.g., Laughlin, 2004; McNay, McCarty, & Gold, 2001; 
Siesjo, 1978; Weiss, 1986; Reivich & Alavi, 1983).  Similarly, glucose is shown 
to have significant correlations with cognitive functions such as WMC (Foster, 
Lidder, & Sünram, 1998; Martin & Benton, 1999; Krebs & Parent, 2005).   
Taken together, these cognitive and physiological measures suggest that 
self-regulation does deplete the same cognitive resource required for proper 
control of attention.  Relevant to the current project, this proposes then that 
drivers who have been (or are currently) self-regulating could be under higher 
attentional demands than outwardly perceptible.  Importantly, it is possible that 
self-regulation demands are different from other secondary tasks typically used in 
driving research (e.g., talking on a cellphone) in that self-regulation could 
simultaneously impact rationality, in addition to core attentional processing.   
For example, in a study by Shiv & Fedorikhin (1999), evidence was found 
supporting the maladaptive effects of relatively low-level mental rehearsal on 
6 
rational choice self-regulation. Subjects were either given two digits or seven 
digits to store and subsequently recall after a short period of rehearsal.  While 
subjects were in the processes of rehearsal, they were offered a choice of either 
fruit (self-regulating choice) or chocolate cake (impulsive choice).  Subjects with 
more digits to rehearse more frequently chose the impulsive choice, while 
subjects with fewer digits to rehearse were more likely to chose the self-regulating 
choice.  Thus, individuals whose attention was placed under load through simple 
mental rehearsal were less able to rationalize the dietary consequences of 
consuming high-calorie foods, and the subsequent suppress of irrational behaviors 
(Ward & Mann 2000). This study highlights how relatively low demand cognitive 
tasks can negatively affect self-regulation, leading individuals to select 
impulsively and irrationally.  Further, investigations into the relationship between 
ego-depletion and aggression (an impulsive emotion) propose that when self-
regulating (e.g. through abstinence from the urge to eat tempting food or 
suppression of physical and emotional responses to a film), subjects produce more 
aggressive reactions when provoked compared to those who were unregulated 
(Stucke & Baumeister, 2007; DeWall et al., 2009). This likelihood to commit 
aggressive actions seems especially important considering the frequency of 
instances of such phenomenon like ‘road rage’ that happen every day on populace 
roadways.  Despite the commonplace occurrence of such impulsive and irrational 
behavior on roadways (i.e., tailgating, speeding, erratic lane changes, etc.), 
knowledge on the effects of self-regulation on attentional control within the 
context of driving behavior is sparse.    
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 Relative to driving behaviors, this research proposes that self-regulating 
drivers, while traversing relatively low-level secondary task conditions, may 
actually be under more attentional demands than outwardly evident.  In other 
words, should individuals feel the need to self-regulate before (or during) their 
commute, their ability to effectively allocate attention towards rational highway 
behavior might be affected, in addition to their ability to operate the vehicle itself.  
It is important to understand how these findings may affect drivers because the 
need for self-regulation is actually fairly common in everyday driving scenarios.  
For example, self-regulation over one’s emotional state might be necessary across 
several scenarios routinely encountered while in-vehicle such as following a slow-
moving lead vehicle in a no-passing zone, having to stop at a prolonged traffic-
light, following questionable traffic regulations, etc.  It is also possible that self-
regulation on the roadway can be activated by the individual themselves 
(independent of the driving task) should they be driving during or after denial of 
certain pleasures in their personal lives (e.g. dietary regulation, emotion 
suppression, unpleasant working conditions, etc.).  While troubling, it is entirely 
possible drivers could be experiencing these situations (and thus need to self-
regulate) multiple times during the same trip for multiple different reasons.     
Further, it is reasonable to assume that the cognitive processing ability 
needed to command a vehicle negatively interacts with self-regulation demands, 
and vice-versa.  As such, drivers’ maladaptive behaviors could be a result of not 
just a failure to control attention relative to the driving task itself, but also a 
failure to control attention as a result of self-regulation.  This begs to ask the 
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following questions: if self-regulation uses the same ability of attention control as 
cognitive activation, could the combination of low demand cognitive activation 
and low influence self-regulation produce maladaptive driving behaviors?   
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Chapter 3 
METHODS 
Pretest 
Participants’ WMC was determined using a computerized assessment of 
WMC, Automated Operation Span (AOSPAN; Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock & 
Engle, 2005). AOSPAN is a computerized version of the original Operation Span 
task (Turner and Engle 1989), which has been shown to be reliable and diagnostic 
for determining WMC differences (Unsworth et al., 2005). In AOSPAN 
participants were asked to determine the validity of a series of simple math 
equations.  After each equation participants were presented a letter to remember 
for a later recall. Upon completion of a trial, participants identified the presented 
letters in the correct presentation from a matrix of 12 possible choices.  
Participants completed three sets of each trial size, resulting in 75 total items.  
Trial sizes were varied from three to seven math equations. The AOSPAN session 
was self-paced and lasted (on average) approximately 20 minutes.  All 
administration and scoring followed the recommendations of Unsworth et al. 
(2005). 
Driving Simulator 
Driving performance was evaluated using the DS-600c Advanced 
Research Simulator by DriveSafety™. Participants were surrounded by a 300 deg 
wraparound display as they sat inside a full-width automobile cabin (Ford Focus) 
mounted on a motion platform.  The motion platform provided appropriate inertial 
cues for the replication of longitudinal acceleration and deceleration.  Dynamic 
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torque feedback from the steering wheel and vibration transducers mounted under 
the driver’s seat provided tactile and proprioceptive feedback.  Software provided 
by DriveSafety™ captured salient driving performance elements such as velocity, 
time headway, and lane variance at 60 Hz. Driver’s current speed was displayed 
in the car cabin dashboard through an integrated speedometer. 
The driving course featured a two lane road (two lanes going one way and 
another two lanes going the other way) with a stop light before each provoker.  
Throughout the course, in every condition, participants encountered common 
transgressions by other vehicles and traffic regulations.  These encounters were 
included to serve as provokers, which have been shown to activate aggressive 
behavior in self-regulating participants (Gal & Liu, 2007; DeWall et al, 2007; 
Stucke & Baumeister 2006).  Subjects first drove to the first stop light. Stopped 
for approximately two (2) seconds then drove through an open, two lane stretch of 
road.  Subjects average speed and maximum speed was measured at this point to 
serve as control.  Upon taking a banked left turn, subjects encountered another 
stop light, which lasted for approximately two (2) seconds at which point they 
encountered mild, obstructing traffic moving at 45 mph.  Subjects maximum 
acceleration was measured at this stop light.  Once subjects were 3 seconds to the 
rear of the traffic obstruction, a tailgating SUV was programmed to begin 
following subjects at a THW of one (1) second.  The tailgating vehicle was visible 
in the driver’s rear view mirror and audibly present.  During this provoker 
manipulation, subjects average THW and shortest THW was measured.  This 
provoker was followed by an open two lane stretch of road and a banked turn.  
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Subjects average speed and maximum speed were measured at this stretch.  Next 
subjects encountered a slow moving lead vehicle moving at approximately 35 
mph.  Subjects average and shortest THW was measured while dealing with this 
provoker.  This was followed by an open, two lane stretch of road where subjects 
average and maximum speed was measured.  Then finally, after taking another 
banked turn, subjects encountered a prolonged stop light.  This light lasted 
approximately one (1) minute with little to no traffic going in the perpendicular 
direction.  Throughout the course, traffic going the opposite direction was 
programmed to be medium congestion travelling at speeds of 45-55 mph.  A 
speed limit ranging from 40 to 60 MPH was explicitly stated to the subject before 
each run.   
Procedure 
 Thirty-two (N = 32) undergraduates from a large public university 
participated in this experiment. All participants were compensated with course 
credit in an introductory psychology class.  Participants first completed a practice 
run to familiarize themselves with the dynamics of the driving simulator, followed 
by a control run (run 1), a digits rehearsal run (run 2), and a combination digits 
rehearsal + self-regulated run or digits rehearsal + unregulated run (run 3).  In the 
control condition, participants drove through the course under instruction to 
follow normal, lawful driving convention as they would should they be 
commuting a familiar road.  This instruction was repeated before each subsequent 
run after subjects had completed a five minute break.  In the digits rehearsal run, 
participants traversed the course while mentally rehearsing a random five digit 
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number and letter combination, which was presented on the driving simulator 
screen at the beginning of the drive.  Five digits were chosen because of its low 
demands on attentional control (Miller 1956; Cowan 2001).  Consequently, this 
condition was not expected to significantly differ from control and was included 
to observe if attentional control through mental rehearsal is affected by self-
regulation.  Afterwards, were randomly assigned to either the self-regulation 
group or the unregulated group.  Participants were sat in front of a computer 
screen and asked to watch a slideshow consisting of a series of emotionally 
evocative images.  Participants in the self-regulation group were instructed to 
regulate all facial, emotionally, and bodily reaction while watching the slideshow.  
This activity has been shown to be sufficient in exacting ego-depletion on subjects 
(Dewall et al. 2007; Glass et al. 1969).  Participants in the unregulated group were 
instructed to react as they saw fit to the slideshow content.  Finally, the self-
regulation group and the unregulated group returned to the driving simulator and 
completed a combination digits-rehearsal + self-regulation or non-regulated run.  
Participants’ driving performances on the variables of average and maximum 
velocity, acceleration, and time headway were measured for each run during and 
after each manipulation. Upon completion of the final run, subjects were 
instructed to grab a debriefing slip next to a bowl of chocolates on their way out. 
The number of chocolates they took was counted as an implicit measure of the 
slideshow’s effectiveness in inducing self-regulation. 
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Chapter 4 
RESULTS & DISCUSSION 
Average & Maximum Speed, Acceleration & THW  
We compared the control group and self-regulating group’s average and 
maximum speed at each provoker location (i.e. slow lead vehicle, tailgaters, and 
long stop light) from run 1 to run 3. Average and shortest THW was measured 
and compared in the same way at provoker locations where subjects encountered 
a a tailgating rear vehicle and slow moving lead vehicle.   
Tailgaters.  During this provoker manipulation, subject’s average THW to 
the lead vehicle was measured.  Average THW was significantly different when 
comparing run 1 to run 3 (F (1, 32) = 3.09, p  = 0.05), with subjects shortening 
average THW in run 3 compared to run 1. See Figure 1. This was not mitigated by 
WMC (F(3,32) < 1, p = .84). The control group and self-regulating group, with 
the covariate of WMC, showed no difference in average THW while following a 
lead vehicle and dealing with a tailgating rear vehicle (F(1,32) < 1,  p = .93).  
After dealing with the tailgating rear vehicle, subjects encountered an open, two-
lane road where average speed was measured.  There was no significant 
difference in average speed from run 1 to run 3 (F(1,32) = 2.48., p = .13 ). There 
was no interaction with WMC (F(3,32) < 1, p = .67), but there was a significant 
difference between groups (F(3,32) = 3.50, p = .03), with the low span control 
group driving at significantly faster speeds compared to the others. There was no 
difference on average acceleration from run 1 to run 3 (F(1,32) < 1, p = .40) and 
no interaction with WMC (F(3,32) < 1, p > .53).  Also there was no significant 
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difference between groups (F(3,32) = 1.07, p > .38).  Maximum accelerator 
pressure not significant when comparing run 1 to run 3 (F(1, 32) = 4.02, p = .06) 
with no interaction with WMC (F(3, 32) < 1.00, p = .60) and no difference 
between groups (F(3,32) < 1, p = .83).    
However, comparing the low WMC, self-regulated subjects to the low 
WMC control group, the former showed a significant increase in accelerator pedal 
pressure from the control run compared to the final run F(1,11) = 7.53, p = .03) 
with a significant interaction (F(3,11) = 8.50, p = .02).  There was no significant 
difference between the two low span groups (F(1,11) < 1, p = .91).  See Figure 2.  
There was no difference from run 1 to run 3 on the variable of shortest THW (F(1, 
32) = 1.60, p = .22), no interaction with WMC (F(3, 32) = 1.07, p  = .38).  There 
was no difference between groups (F(3,32) = 1.07, p = .38). No significant 
difference from run 1 to run 3 on the variable of maximum speed (F(1,32) = 3.04, 
p = .09), no significant interaction with WMC (F(3, 32) = 1.09, p = .37). There 
was a significant difference between groups (F(3, 32) = 6.24, p = 0.00), 
suggesting that low span control subjects tend to drive faster. See following 
Figure 3. 
Slow lead vehicle. Average THW, when comparing run 1to run 3, was not 
significantly different (F(1,32) < 1, p = .33), there was no interaction with WMC 
(F(3,32) < 1, p = .59). There was no significant difference between groups while 
following a slow moving lead vehicle (F(3,32) = 2.31, p = .10).  There was a 
significant difference from Run 1 to Run 3on the measure of average speed 
(F(1,32) = 9.05, p =0.005), unexpectedly showing a decline in speed from run 1 to 
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run 3. This is suspected to have occurred due to influence from the slow moving 
lead vehicle in association of proper speed.  See Figure 4. This was not affected 
by WMC (F(3,32) < 1, p > .5). There was no significant difference between 
groups (F(3,32) < 1, p = .51). There was no significant difference in maximum 
speed from run 1 & run 3 (F(1,32) = 2.17, p = .15), with no interaction with 
WMC (F(3,32) = 1.03, p =.40)  But the groups showed a significant difference 
between subjects in maximum speed (F(3,32) = 3.24, p =.04). See Figure 5.  
No significant difference from Run 1 to Run 3 with the variable of shortest 
THW (F(1,32) = 3.30, p = 0.08), with no interaction with WMC (F(3,32) < 1, p = 
.48), and no difference between groups (F(3,32) = 1.15, p = 0.35).  Maximum 
acceleration was not measured at this provoker manipulation.  
Long stop light.  After enduring a seemingly useless, prolonged stop light, 
subjects’ average and maximum speed was measured.  Average speed from run 1 
to run 3 was significantly different (F(1,32) = 4.67, p = .04).  See Figure 6.  
However there was no interaction with WMC (F(3,32) = 1.49, p = .24) and no 
difference between groups (F(3,64) < 1, p = .45).  There was no significant 
difference from run 1 to run 3 on the variable of maximum speed (F(1,32) = 1.44, 
p = .24). There was no interaction with WMC (F(3,32) = 1.20, p = .33) and no 
significant difference between groups (F(3,32) = 1.63, p = .21). Average 
acceleration was not significantly different from run 1 compared to run 3 (F(1,32) 
= 3.41, p = .07) with no interaction with WMC (F(2,32) = 1.95, p = .14).  There 
was no significant difference between groups (F(2,32) < 1, p > .57). There was 
significant difference in maximum acceleration from run 1 to run 3 (F(1,32) = 
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9.96, p = .004).  But no interaction with WMC (F(3,32) < 1, p = .73). No 
significant difference between groups (F(3,32)< 1, p = .73).  See Figure 7. 
Self-regulation.  The self-regulation group took twice as many chocolates 
from the bowl (14) compared to the control group (7).  Given research regarding 
glucose and self-regulation, it is within reason to assume that this self-regulation 
manipulation supports current interpretation of self-regulation efficacy. 
These results suggest that subjects tend to display maladaptive driving 
behaviors after a few sessions of driving.  This maladaptive change in driving 
behavior is hypothesized to be due to complacency or practice effects, as a result 
of attention demands from the driving task.  However, despite the shortcomings 
and limitations of this study, some of the results suggest that self-regulation & 
WMC may have some affect should the limitations be addressed. 
Limitations 
A couple limitations of this study should be considered for future research.  
One such limitation was the low number of subjects with some groups.  This 
affected power of the findings and this author believes that addressing this issue 
will show a stronger affect to driving variables relative to WMC and self-
regulation.  The final limitation was the driving course itself.  Due to 
shortcomings in the programming software, we were forced to use an 
environment that some subjects believed to suggest a cityscape with transitions to 
highway sections.  It is likely that this may have moderated selection of driving 
speeds within subjects.  The optimum environment would not have these implicit 
cues. It would be interesting to see how this research would translate to a driving 
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course that was purely seen as highway given that current highways show the 
most variability in driving behaviors amongst commuters.  Further 
experimentation should be performed to assess the efficacy of self-regulation on 
attentional control ability as it affects driver behavior.  
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Chapter 5 
FIGURES & CHARTS 
 
Figure 1: Subjects Average THW was significantly different from run 1 to run 3 (F (2, 
32) = 3.09, p  = 0.05), with all groups showing a decrease in THW presumed to be due to 
practice effects.  
 
Figure 2: When comparing the low WMC, self-regulated subjects to the low 
WMC control group, the former showed a significant increase in accelerator 
pedal pressure from run 1 to run 3 (F(1,11) < 1, p = .91).  
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Figure 3: There was a significant difference between groups (F(3, 32) = 6.24, p = 
0.00) on the variable of maximum speed, suggesting that low span control 
subjects tend to drive faster after dealing with a tailgating vehicle compared to 
the other groups. 
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Figure 4: Significant difference from run 1 to run 3 (F(1,32) = 9.05, p <=.005) 
on the variable of average speed after following a slow moving lead vehicle.  
Unexpectedly, subjects decreased average speed from run 1 to run 3. 
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Figure 5: The groups showed a significant difference between subjects in 
maximum speed (F(3,32) = 3.24, p =.04, with the control groups starting at faster 
speeds in run 1 compared to the self-regulated groups). 
 
Figure 6: Subjects showed significant difference in average speed from run 1 to run 3 
after waiting at a prolonged stop light with no cross traffic present (F(1,32) = 4.67, p < 
.05), increasing maximum speed for all groups except the low WMC control group. 
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Figure 7: There was significant difference in maximum acceleration from run 1 to run 3 
(F(1,32) = 9.96, p = .004), after waiting at a prolonged stop light.   
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